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A model is developed which rationalizes contracts that give depositors the right to obtain funds on
demand even when depositors intend to use these funds for consumption in the future. This is explained
by depositor overoptimism regarding their own ability to collect funds in a run. Capitalized institutions
serving depositors with such beliefs emerge in equilibrium even if depositors and bank owners have
the same preferences and the same investment opportunities. Various government regulations of these
institutions, including minimum capital levels, requirements concerning the assets they may hold,
deposit insurance and compulsory clawbacks in bankruptcy can raise the average ex post welfare of
depositors.
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jrotemberg@hbs.eduThis paper shows that a simple cognitive bias that seems consistent with experimental
evidence can account for the popularity of demandable deposits. The cognitive bias I consider
is a form of overcon¯dence: people are too optimistic about their future position in line
when they expect scarce resources to be distributed on a ¯rst-come ¯rst-served basis. For
depositors, this would imply overoptimism concerning their chances to recover their funds
in a bank run. This does not require depositors to consider themselves well informed. It is
su±cient for them to believe that other depositors are even slower to react than they are.
The main result of the paper is that this overcon¯dence can rationalize demandable de-
posit contracts even when everyone derives the same utility from consumption in every state
of nature, everyone has the same investment opportunities and everyone has the same beliefs
regarding the payo®s of these investments. Overoptimistic agents deposit their endowment
with other agents in exchange for the right to be paid on a ¯rst-come ¯rst-served basis. They
do this even though they are risk averse and they rationally recognize that ¯rst-come ¯rst
served contract are risky because they lead early withdrawers in a run to more consumption
than late ones.
Because some agents are overoptimistic, it is possible to increase their average ex post
utility with suitably designed policy interventions. This leads me to consider four di®erent
types of policies. The ¯rst is a policy of imposing \clawbacks" in bankruptcy so that deposi-
tors who arrive too late to receive anything from their bank can recover resources from those
who withdrew earlier. The result is that all depositors end up being treated symmetrically
at all times, as assumed by Allen and Gale (1998). In the U. S., bankruptcy law requires
such clawbacks in the case of non¯nancial bankruptcies but exempts ¯nancial institutions.
The second policy I examine is the provision of deposit insurance ¯nanced by taxation.
Like clawbacks, this avoids ine±cient runs, which is particularly useful when runs lead to
costly transfers of assets. When such transfers (or liquidations) are costless, an alternative
policy that also tends to raise ex post welfare, and which may be administratively more
expedient, is to force bank owners to put up more of their own capital. Finally, I demonstrate
that it is possible to raise this welfare by forcing banks to hold assets that they would
1otherwise shun.
A central motivation for the analysis in this paper is that demandable liabilities, i.e.,
liabilities with the property that claimants are entitled to receive predetermined quantities
of a valuable asset whenever they want to, have been ubiquitous for a long time. Mueller
(1997, p. 15-25) shows that they were important in XIVth century Venice, well before any
government provided deposit insurance might have made such deposits safe. Indeed, de-
mandable deposits have proven unsafe in a number of instances.1 This was particularly true
in the American Free Banking era where, as Hasan and Dwyer (1996) report, numerous
banks closed without ful¯lling all their contractual obligations to depositors.
In the current U.S. context, a di®erent but equally remarkable feature of demandable
liabilities is their enormous volume. According to the Flow of Funds Accounts, total ¯nancial
assets of households were about $ 31 trillion in 2000.2 At the same time, Bucks et al. (2009)
report that in the Survey of Consumer Finances Surveys of both 1998 and 2001, households
held 11.4 % of their ¯nancial assets in \transactions accounts" (which are basically accounts
that are immediately available). This means that the total held in these accounts was about
$ 3.5 trillion. For comparison, total annual consumer expenditure on goods and services in
the U.S. equaled $ 6.8 trillion in 2000. Most consumers are also receiving income from other
sources with at least a monthly frequency, so that transactions balances of the same size as
monthly consumer expenditures ought to be su±cient to pay for these expenditures in the
vast majority of circumstances. It follows that many households have \transactions balances"
that exceed the maximum they could possibly need for transactions over an horizon of, say,
three months.
The enormous volume of demandable deposits suggests that the most widely used the-
oretical rationale for their existence, namely the rationale o®ered in Diamond and Dybvig
(1983), may not su±ce. Diamond and Dybvig (1983) let consumers be uncertain about
1Mueller (1997) also documents several instances of bank failures and notes their cost to \the unlucky
depositors who failed to withdraw his money in time" (p. 121).
2This is the last year for which Supplemental table L100a lists the assets of nonpro¯t institutions. For
subsequent years, only the total of households and nonpro¯t institutions is available.
2whether they will need funds relatively quickly, and show that demandable deposits provide
insurance against the risk of having such a need. This insurance has a price, however, so
that consumers with funds that are intended for consumption beyond a short horizon would
be better o® holding long term assets.3 In my analysis, by contrast, depositors who intend to
consume far into the future hold demandable assets because these give them the opportunity
to change their portfolio at will on terms that are determined in advance.
An essential component of the model is that depositors all seek to change their portfolio,
and thus run on the institution that issued demand deposits, when there are bad news
regarding the assets held by the institution. The model is thus consistent with the empirical
literature on the incidence of banking panics. Gorton's (1988) pioneering paper studied runs
in the U.S. National Banking Era (1863-1914) and showed that these occurred mostly at
times of weak business conditions, when bank loans were presumably impaired. Similarly,
Hasan and Dwyer (1996) show that bank runs in the Free Banking Era (1836-1863) mostly
took place when banks held bonds that had fallen in value. Lastly, Schumacher (2000) shows
that the banks that experienced runs in Argentina after the 1994 Mexico crisis tended to
have relatively weak balance sheets.
The best studied runs involve deposits at commercial banks. Still, U.S. Money Market
Mutual Funds seem to be subject to similar runs even though they do not explicitly specify
how much their depositors will be able to withdraw in the future. They may do so implicitly,
however. At least some of these funds have maintained the right of investors to redeem
each \share" for one dollar when the assets underlying these shares were worth less. As an
example, a fund called the \Reserve Primary Fund" su®ered declines in the value of its claims
on Lehman Brothers as Lehman was going bankrupt in 2008, and this led to a run. The
fund's liabilities stood at $62.6 billion on Friday, September 12, and a °ood of redemptions
reduced this to $23 billion by Tuesday, September 16 at 3 p.m. Redemption requests received
3It is worth noting that Bryant (1980) models the risk of needing to consume early as being the risk
of learning early in one's life that one will die imminently, and then wishing to consume all one's assets.
I have interpreted this as a metaphor for short term changes in the desire to consume but it may apply
more broadly. Bryant (1980) motivates his paper as providing a rationalization for deposit insurance and
the current paper could be motivated similarly.
3before this point were honored at $1 a share. At 3 p.m. redemptions were frozen, and the
fund was then slowly liquidated. Investors who remained at 3 p.m. were paid o® gradually,
and received substantially less than $1 per share.
The bias considered in this paper is closely related to forms of overcon¯dence demon-
strated that have been documented in the past. One oft-cited ¯nding in the literature is that
survey responses display an \optimistic bias."4 Weinstein (1980) was one of the ¯rst to ex-
hibit this phenomenon. He showed that survey respondents tend to say that the probability
that they will obtain desirable outcomes (like having a mentally gifted child) is higher than
the probability that their peers will obtain these outcomes. By contrast, respondents report
that their own probability of a bad outcome such as a heart attack or a drinking problem
is lower than that of their peers.5 Weinstein (1980) also reports that this bias is larger for
events that people judge to be controllable. The ¯nding that perception of control is corre-
lated with increased optimism about risky outcomes has been reproduced by a number of
authors.6
One issue that arises at this point is how people come to have the perception that they
control an outcome. Interestingly, this does not appear to require much actual in°uence.
As Langer (1975) shows, numerous manipulations can give people an \illusion of control."
One of the most striking pieces of evidence for this can be found in Strickland, Lewicki and
Katz (1966) and Rothbart and Snyder (1970). These papers show that people express more
con¯dence that they know the outcomes from rolls of dice, and that are willing to wager
more of their own funds on these outcomes, when they place their bets before they roll the
dice rather than afterwards. This is true even though the one would not expect the outcome
of a dice throw to depend on whether a bet is placed on it beforehand. What is particularly
useful about these experiments is that they do involve actual payo®s and therefore the
4In October 2010, Google Scholar lists about 5,000 works using the term.
5Harris and Hahn (2010) point out that these results could be a statistical artifact which results from
the fact that many of the positive outcomes studied by Weinstein (1980) (like getting a job one likes) were
common while many of the negative outcomes (like attempting suicide) were uncommon. Still, the base rates
for several of the positive and negative e®ects demonstrated by Weinstein (1980) (including those I mention
in the text) seem comparable.
6See Thompson et al (1998) for a valuable discussion.
4interpretation of the results is not marred by the ambiguity of natural language.7
Obtaining a scarce product that is distributed on a ¯rst-come ¯rst-served basis does
require one to take action, and people may well feel quite a bit of control over this outcome.
Moreover, people who entrust a debtor with funds often have a strong desire to receive it
back. This too may foster a false sense of control. As Thompson et. al (1998, p. 151) put
it, \When people have a strong need for an outcome or a strong commitment to getting
the outcome, they know that their intention to obtain the outcome is strong, and this may
in°uence their judgment of control."
Related Literature. This paper is related to two behavioral literatures in economics. The
¯rst concerns overcon¯dence about one's own abilities. B¶ enabou and Tirole (2002), Compte
and Postlewaite (2004), and KÄ oszegi (2006) discuss methods agents use to manipulate their
own beliefs that can lead to overcon¯dence. Yildiz (2003) analyzes the e®ect of overcon¯-
dence in bargaining games. Sandroni and Squintani (2004) propose a model in which over-
con¯dence a®ects insurance markets. Manove and Padilla (1999) and Landier and Thesmar
(2009) develop models of equilibrium contracts between rational lenders and overoptimistic
entrepreneurs. Landier and Thesmar (2009) also present evidence that, consistent with their
theory, entrepreneurs who respond with more excessive optimism in a survey also take on
more short term debt. Also focusing on empirical di®erences in overcon¯dence across people,
Grinblatt and Keloharju (2009) show that Finnish investors whose survey responses suggest
that they are more overcon¯dent trade stocks more frequently.
This last paper also belongs to a second literature that is related to the current paper.
This second literature studies the e®ect of cognitive limitations on the behavior of ¯nancial
market participants. This includes, notably, Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998)
and Odean (1998), who show that various puzzles in the behavior of stock prices can be
rationalized by the existence of investors who are overcon¯dent about their ability to predict
7Camerer and Lovallo (1999) report another experiment with ¯nancial payo®s in which subjects act as
if they are overcon¯dent. Their subjects express more willingness to participate in an \investment game,"
and thereby make it more likely that they will receive low payo®s, when the outcome of the game depends
on their relative skill at a trivia task than when the outcome depends on a randomization device.
5the future.8 Incorrect predictions about the future play a role in many other papers concerned
with asset prices, including Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) and Hong, Stein and Yu
(2007). Gennaioli, Shleifer and Vishny (2010) show that incorrect beliefs can also lead agents
to hold new asset classes that appear safe to them because they have not yet become aware
of some of their incipient risks. One distinction between this literature and the current paper
is that I focus on beliefs that people have about their own future actions rather than beliefs
they have about external events.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section introduces my formulation of overcon-
¯dence into a one period model with certainty. By showing how individuals trade o® risk
aversion, which makes demand deposits undesirable, with excessive optimism, this section
lays the foundation for the subsequent analysis. Section 2 shows that overcon¯dence can
make demand deposits emerge in equilibrium in a simple stochastic environment where ev-
eryone starts with an identical endowment whose payo® is stochastic. With two aggregate
states of nature, depositors are fully paid o® in the favorable state while there is a run in the
unfavorable one. In Section 3, I let bank owners capitalize their banks in order to attract
depositors and show that they quite generally do it in equilibrium. Section 4 studies policy
interventions that have the potential for raising the average ex post utility of depositors.
These include minimal capital requirements, mandatory clawbacks in bankruptcy, deposit
insurance and the regulation of bank assets. Section 5 expands the model to include three
periods so that it is possible to analyze costly withdrawals in the middle period. The sec-
tion demonstrates that banks may o®er contracts that induce these costly withdrawals in
response to bad news. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
8These papers rely on miscalibration, i.e., people's tendency to overstate the precision of their knowledge.
For direct evidence of miscalibration by ¯nancial managers, see Ben-David et al. (2010). Ben-David et
al. (2010) distinguish between miscalibration, which they see as a form of overcon¯dence, and \optimism"
regarding the mean exogenous random variables. Following Weinstein (1980), I use the term \optimism"
to describe a di®erent kind of overcon¯dence, namely people's excessive con¯dence in their ability to a®ect
their own outcomes favorably.
61 Queuing Optimism with Aggregate Certainty
To introduce the idea of optimism regarding one's position in a queue, consider ¯rst a general
setting of rationing. Suppose a ¯rm has given N individuals the right to obtain a good at
a price that is lower than consumers' valuation of the good. Suppose further that the ¯rm
has only Z < N units available and that it has promised to allocate its units to creditors
on a ¯rst-come ¯rst-served basis, as is common in shortage situations. Then, if creditors are
symmetric and rational, each of them should each expect to receive it with probability Z=N.
The simplest way to formalize this probabilistic outcome is to suppose that some random
elements, however insigni¯cant in size, a®ect creditors' position in line. Suppose then, that
creditors' actual order of arrival depends on the realization they draw of a random variable
d, with creditors who obtain a lower d arriving before those who obtain a higher one. One
interpretation for this is that d is the distance between a creditor and the ¯rm at the moment
the creditor decides to obtain the good. An alternative interpretation would have all creditors
start out at the same distance from the ¯rm, while the outcome d would represent the inverse
of the speed with which a particular creditor is able to cover this distance.
Let F be the cumulative density function for d. Then, creditors whose d is smaller
than or equal to F ¡1(Z=N) receive the good while others do not. Since F(d) is distributed
uniformly between zero and one, the probability of obtaining such a d is Z=N. Since creditors
are a®ected only by the order in which they arrive, one can equivalently think of them as
drawing a realization for x = F(d), where x has a standard uniform distribution.
Queuing optimism is captured as follows. Each creditor is assumed to correctly believe
that the x's of other creditors are drawn from a standard uniform distribution. On the other
hand, creditors believe that their own x is drawn from a truncated exponential distribution
with cumulative density function G(x) given by
G(x;¸) =
1 ¡ e¡¸x
1 ¡ e¡¸ : (1)
The combination of these beliefs leads creditors to view G(x;¸) as being equal to their own
probability of being among the ¯rst 100x% to arrive. The limit of G(x) when ¸ goes to zero
7Figure 1:



































































is x so that this limit corresponds to individuals who are rational. At the other extreme, an
individual with a ¸ equal to one is essentially certain to be the ¯rst in line. More generally,
the Appendix shows that G(x) is strictly increasing in ¸ for 0 < x < 1. The parameter ¸
is thus a measure of optimism: creditors with higher ¸'s are strictly more optimistic about
that the likelihood that they will be among the ¯rst 100x% of creditors to ask for the good.
The function G(x) is displayed for a few values of ¸ in Figure 1




1 ¡ e¡¸ G
00(x) = ¡
¸2e¡¸x
1 ¡ e¡¸; (2)
so that G0(x) declines as x rises. For low values of x, the slope of people's subjective
probability of being among the ¯rst x rises more rapidly than the actual probability. This
can be seen by noting that G0(0) equals ¸=(1 ¡ e¡¸), which is greater than one for ¸ > 0.
For high values of x, on the other hand, the subjective probability of being among the ¯rst x
rises more slowly than the actual probability because, as I show below, the Einstein function
¸e¡¸=(1¡e¡¸) is smaller than one. There thus exists an interior value of x at which G0(x) = 1
8and the overoptimistic bias G(x) ¡ x is the largest. This value of x plays a role in what
follows.
So far, the analysis applies to any ¯rm that is required to ration its customers.9 This
bias may be particularly relevant in situations where actual rationing is infrequent, so that
people have not had an opportunity to learn about their actual tendency to be at the front
of the line. As long as there are only occasional bank runs, the bias should be particularly
pronounced for the rationing that takes place in these runs.
While queueing optimism a®ects people's subjective probability of receiving funds, it need
not a®ect how creditors value the funds they receive. It is thus consistent with individuals
having a standard expected utility function. For convenience, suppose that this utility
function takes the CRRA form with relative risk aversion between 0 and -1. Creditors thus
expect their welfare to be
Uc = ¹ E(C
°) 0 < ° · 1; (3)
where ¹ E takes expectations using their own perceptions and C are the funds they receive.
To understand the implications of queueing optimism on ¯nancial contracts, it is worth
starting with the simple case where a bank has signed contracts that entitle a continuum of
creditors of mass one to receive a quantity of funds Y on a ¯rst-come ¯rst-served basis. The
bank, meanwhile has Z · Y funds available. The bank's owners are assumed to have limited
liability so that the bank closes after Z has been paid out and only Z=Y arrive in time to
receive funds from the bank. The amount that these creditors get to keep, and the amounts
received by the rest, depend on the legal regime. Under laissez-faire, the government does
not intervene so that the Z=Y creditors that arrive ¯rst keep the Y they obtained from the
bank and the rest remain empty-handed.
An alternative is for the government to allow the last 1 ¡ Z=Y creditors to clawback
funds from those who were paid by the bank. In ordinary bankruptcy, payments made up
to 90 days before the ¯ling of bankruptcy (what is known as the \preference period") are
9This bias may also help explain why people often favor non-price rationing. For example, Frey and
Pommerehne (1993) ¯nd that many respondents prefer to distribute a limited supply of water on a ¯rst-
come ¯rst-serve rather than using high prices to discourage demand.
9potentially subject to such clawbacks. Under many circumstances, creditors that are paid
during the preference period can be forced to return these funds to a bankruptcy trustee,
who then treats them like other claimants.10
Suppose ¯rst that creditors are rational so that, when Z · Y , they each expect to receive





The derivative of this expression with respect to Y is (° ¡ 1)ZY °¡2, which is negative if
° < 1. This means that risk averse creditors would prefer lowering Y towards Z whenever
Y exceeds Z. They thus strictly prefer a clawback regime that gives Z to all creditors. This
result ought to generalize. Whenever Y > Z, laissez-faire leads to a gamble that pays zero
with probability 1¡Z=Y and Y with the remaining probability. For risk-averse individuals,
this is less desirable than the clawback regime, which pays the expected value of this gamble
(Z=Y ) with probability one.
With queueing optimism, creditors' expected utility from the promise of a payment of Y
by a debtor who has Z · Y funds per creditor is
Uc =
1 ¡ e¡¸Z=Y
1 ¡ e¡¸ Y
°; (5)




















The right hand side of this inequality is an Einstein function, which is depicted in Figure
2 and which I denote by n(¸). This function equals one in the limit where ¸ = 0 and is
10In the United States, these \preference actions" are governed by the U.S. Code Chapter 11, section 547.
Section 546 of the same chapter contains exceptions that apply to ¯rms in the ¯nancial sector. See Bliss
and Kaufman (2007) for a discussion of this and other di®erences between the way that banks and other
corporations are treated when they become insolvent.
10Figure 2:










declining in ¸ for ¸ > 0. This means that, for every ¸ > 0, there is a critical ° < 1 such that
creditors prefer setting Y above Z for any ° larger than this critical value and prefer setting
Y equal to Z for values of ° below it. Risk aversion thus continues to act as a reason for
people to prefer not to have their outcome be determined by their random position in line.
However, there is now a counteracting force, namely that ¸ > 0 leads people to be con¯dent
that they will not be among the very last to arrive. People thus prefer a Y that exceeds Z
if and only if their risk aversion is below a threshold that is increasing in ¸. Put di®erently,
increases in both ° and in ¸ induce a greater desire to have Y exceed Z.
When the degree of risk aversion is below this threshold, the optimal value of Y from the

















11While the function Uc need not be globally concave in Y , a straightforward calculation establishes that
its second derivative with respect to Y is negative at the point where this equation is satis¯ed.
11The optimum thus requires that the ratio of Z to Yo, which is the probability that depositors
are paid, be equal to a constant ro that depends only on ° and ¸. Since the n function is
decreasing, ro falls with both ° and ¸.
While (7) implies that creditors prefer a payment of Yo to one of Z, they do not prefer the
laissez faire outcome for all Y higher than Yo. This is seen in (5), which implies that the limit
of Uc when Y goes to in¯nity equals zero whenever ° is strictly less than one. With any risk
aversion at all, there exist values of Y large enough that creditors prefer the certain clawback
payo® Z to the laissez faire lottery that pays Y with probability Z=Y . So, even when (7)
is satis¯ed, there is a maximum value of Y such that people would ¯nd the laissez faire
outcome acceptable relative to the clawback outcome. At this value of Y , denoted by Ym,
creditors are indi®erent between having Z for sure or the laissez faire outcome. Therefore,
using (5), Ym(Z) satis¯es
1 ¡ e¡¸Z=Ym









1 ¡ e¡¸ r
¡°
m = 1: (10)
The variable rm(°;¸) represents the minimum probability of a distribution of Y that creditors
require for them not to prefer a clawback. For rational creditors, this minimum equals 1,
whereas it is lower if (7) is satis¯ed. This condition also implies that rm is smaller than ro,
since ro gives strictly more utility under laissez faire than under a clawback while the latter
leads to indi®erence. Di®erentiating the second equation in (10), we have
(n(¸rm) ¡ °)(drm=rm) + (n(¸rm) ¡ n(¸))(d¸=¸) ¡ log(rm)d° = 0
When (7) is satis¯ed rm < ro < 1, and this equation implies that both increases in ¸ and
° lower the smallest tolerable ratio rm. This makes sense since, as we discussed, both these
changes in parameters induce a greater desire to participate in a queue.
Before closing this section, it is worth discussing the implicit assumption that the amount
a creditor is paid depends only on whether the bank is able to pay the creditor with its existing
funds, and does not otherwise depend on a creditor's position in line. This assumption turns
12out to be restrictive, in the sense that households would ex ante prefer a more °exible
contract. To see this, imagine a contract that pays y(x) to the household that arrives right
after a fraction x of households have received their required payments from the bank. Since
each household believes that its probability of being among the ¯rst x to claim funds is




1 ¡ e¡¸ dx: (11)
If banks o®ered the contract preferred by creditors, they would maximize this subject to




where this equation takes into account that all x's are in fact equally likely and assures that
the total amount the bank pays out equals its available funds Z. The maximization of (11)









for any x1 and x2 such that y(x1) and y(x2) are strictly positive. Since x1 < x2 leads creditors
to regard x1 as having more density than x2, creditors' expected utility is higher if the bank
makes somewhat larger payments to the creditor that shows up in position x1. I neglect such
contracts for two related reasons. The ¯rst is that the contracts we observe do not appear
to have the property that di®erent people who request funds while the bank remains open
are treated asymmetrically.
The second reason to neglect these more elaborate contracts is that their enforcement
requires the dissemination of a great deal of information, and this is likely to be either costly
or impossible. At the very least, they require that an individual who arrives in position x
be able to demonstrate this position to the courts that enforce this contract. The ¯rst-come
¯rst-served contract requires less hard information. All that needs to be veri¯able for this
contract to be enforceable is whether the bank still has su±cient funds at the moment the
13individual shows up, and whether the individual is in fact paid the ¯xed quantity stipulated
in the contract. One thing that is not required, in particular, is for people who are paid to
either know or be able to prove to others the quantity of funds available to the bank. When
the bank runs out of funds, it needs to prove that its funds have been properly used. This,
however, is a single tally, which needs to be audited just once, as opposed to a running tally
after each individual is paid.
One can rationalize a contract whose payment is constant with the following set of strong
assumptions. Suppose it is impossible to keep track of the number of people who have been
paid already. Suppose further that the ¯rm must pay a ¯xed cost every time it veri¯es the
current state of its assets. This veri¯cation process also checks whether all payments that
have been made to date are legitimate repayments to creditors. This veri¯cation process
leaves behind hard evidence that can be shown to an outside party. Moreover, once hard
evidence exists that the bank has no further assets, it is common knowledge that the bank
has zero assets from then on. Once a creditor arrives at the bank, the order of moves is the
following. First, the bank makes a payment to the creditor. Then, if the creditor receives
any less than the maximum amount he is entitled to under a contract, he forces the bank
to verify its level of current assets (unless this is already known to be zero).12 If the ¯xed
cost of veri¯cation is su±ciently large, the bank avoids all but one veri¯cation by setting its
contractual payment to a constant and waiting to verify until it runs out of funds.13
12This assumption ¯ts broadly with the idea in Rotemberg (2008) that an agent who is \upset" lashes out
at the individual he is upset with. In the current context, individuals who are disappointed at the amount
they receive can then be thought of as going to a judge who, in turn, forces the bank to verify its assets.
13There is some similarity between these assumptions and those used in the costly state veri¯cation
literature pioneered by Townsend (1975). Both have in common that no veri¯cation costs have to be paid
if the ¯rm had su±cient funds to ful¯ll all its obligations. One di®erence is that I have emphasized the
di±culties in verifying a ¯rm's current assets in a context where payments are made in sequence while the
the costly state veri¯cation literature supposes that, at a cost, it is possible to know the total resources that
the ¯rm has available before it distributes any of them. As a result, the allocation in the case where the
state is veri¯ed treats all debt claimants symmetrically. The resulting allocation often coincides with what
I have termed the clawback outcome.
142 Deposit contracts with no bank equity
There are now two periods labeled 0 and 2 (a third period, period 1, will be added below).
The people who are alive at time 0 have utility functions that depend only on the consump-
tion in period 2. Each of these individuals has an endowment of one unit of an asset called
K and this asset pays o® in period 2. The payo® of each unit of K is random: it equals ZH
in the high state (which occurs with probability ¼) and equals ZL in the low state.
There are two types of individuals. One group consists of potential creditors, and these
creditors have the utility function given by (3) with risk aversion coe±cient (1 ¡ °). Under
autarky, their utility level is
Uca = ¼Z
°
H + (1 ¡ ¼)Z
°
L: (12)
The other group consists of potential bank owners. These have utility functions given
by
Ub = ¹ E(C
»
b) 0 < » · 1; (13)
where Cb is their period 2 consumption and ¹ E takes expectations given their own beliefs.
This is identical to the utility function of creditors if » = °. The case where the two types
have the same utility function is particularly interesting because, since they also have the
same endowment, it leaves them without any standard motivation for trading with one
another. Below, I also consider the more traditional case where bankers are risk neutral (so
that » = 1) while creditors are risk averse °.
Groups of 1=! bank owners can o®er contracts to a unit mass of creditors. These contracts
stipulate the amount Y that the bank will distribute in period 2 on a ¯rst-come ¯rst-served
basis to any creditor who has \deposited" their unit of K in period 0. I consider only
contracts where the contractual payment Y is independent of the state of nature. This
assumption, which reduces the attractiveness of the contract relative to laissez-faire, can
be justi¯ed by supposing that the state is not veri¯able at the time that individuals start
making withdrawals.
Bank owners compete for depositors and I capture this by supposing that the equilib-
15rium contract maximizes the expected utility of creditors subject to the constraint that bank
owners are no worse o® than they are under autarky. As I show in the next section, this com-
petition among potential bank owners can lead them to assign some of their own endowment
of K as equity into their bank.
For simplicity, this section ignores such equity infusions. This can be rationalized by
supposing that ! is very large so that bank owners have only a trivial endowment relative
to the deposits at their bank. In terms of modern-day institutions, the analysis without
bank capital corresponds most closely to the analysis of money market mutual funds, whose
managers receive fees but do not invest in an equity cushion.
This section studies whether bank contracts give more expected utility to potential de-
positors than autarky. This is a nontrivial question because banks without capital do not
change the aggregate that depositors consume in any given state of nature. Their only
role is to redistribute funds from some creditors to others. Nonetheless, I demonstrate that
creditors prefer to give their endowment to banks for broad ranges of parameters.
I consider two cases. In the ¯rst, banks are not allowed to set Y above ZH. One reason
this case is interesting is that a contract that o®ers a payment above ZH in period 2 is in
some sense fraudulent, since there is no state of nature where the bank would be able to
fully honor it. Limiting the payment to ZH eliminates this promissory fraud.
One can interpret this limitation as ¯tting broadly with the government's prohibition
that money market mutual funds pay their shareholders more than the "net asset value"
of the fund. Money market funds in the U.S. are regulated pursuant the 1940 Investment
Company Act, which speci¯es both the assets that a mutual fund may hold and the maximum
amounts that it can pay to investors who wish to redeem their shares. Rule 2a-7 of the
Investment Company Act of 1940 stipulates that Money Market Funds are allowed to value
their assets using the \Amortized Cost Method of Valuation." As Rule 2a-7 puts it, this
method values assets at their \acquisition cost as adjusted for amortization of premium or
accretion of discount rather than at their value based on current market factors." One can
thus interpret this rule as saying that money market funds are allowed to make payments
16based on optimistic assessments of returns, which corresponds to ZH. The result, of course,
is that less favorable outcomes lead the market value of the funds' assets (in dollars) to be
lower than the number of shares outstanding.
Within the context of the model itself, allowing payments of more than ZH in period 2
is worse for ex post average depositor welfare than restricting them so they are no larger
than ZH. This could lead the government to prohibit contractual obligations that exceed
the bank's maximum possible resources. Nonetheless, I also consider the case where banks
are free to set any payment that they wish. Part of the interest in doing this is that, even
when banks have this freedom, the equilibrium contract has a payment equal to ZH under
certain conditions.
A payment of ZH gives the same utility in the high state as both the clawback outcome
and autarky. For potential creditors to prefer bank contracts with required payments of ZH,




When the maximum payment Y equals ZH, bank contracts emerge in equilibrium as
long as ¸ > 0 and ° is large enough relative to ¸. This is demonstrated in the following
proposition:
Proposition 1. Let ZL and ZH be arbitrary and de¯ne r by r = ZL=ZH. If ¸ > 0, banks











all potential creditors deposit their endowment in equilibrium.
Proof. Because (15) requires that n(¸) < °, it implies that potential depositors prefer to be
paid more than ZL in the low state. If ° were equal to log((1¡e¡¸r)=(1¡e¡¸))=log(r), ZH
would equal ZL=rm. A necessary and su±cient condition for (14) to be true is thus that ° be
greater than this. Thus, in the low state, depositors prefer a payment of ZH to a payment
17of ZL. With a payment of ZH, depositors are indi®erent in the high state between the bank
contract and autarky. When the state is unknown at time 0, depositors are thus strictly
better o® with a bank contract that o®ers a payment ZH than under autarky.
If depositors prefer a payment below ZH, banks would o®er such a payment. Depositors
would still prefer this contract to autarky even though it would lead bank owners to make
positive pro¯ts in the high state.
The restriction that Y · ZH generally reduces the attractiveness of deposit contracts.
Under some additional conditions, however, banks would want to o®er a contract with a
payment of ZH even when they do not have to. To see this, note ¯rst that creditors who














A contract with Y · ZH pays Y to all depositors in the high state. As long as Y > ZL, the











These two utility functions are di®erent functions of Y , ZL and ZH because a reduction
in the required payment below ZH reduces the expected value of payments while an increase
in the required payment above ZH leaves this expected value unchanged. As result, there is
a range of parameters for which ZH is the level of payment that creditors most prefer.
In particular
Proposition 2. For any ¸ > 0, a required payment of ZH equal to ZL=r with r < 1 is more
desirable than any other required payment as well as being more desirable than autarky, if
















Ã + ° ¡ n(¸)
where Ã = (n(¸r) ¡ °)
1 ¡ e¡¸r
1 ¡ e¡¸ : (19)
Proof. I ¯rst show that (18) de¯nes a nontrivial region. Because the n function decreases
in its argument, n(¸) < n(¸r). If the second inequality in (18) were to hold as an equality,
r would be equal to n¡1(°)=¸. Creditors would then get more utility from ZL=r than from
receiving a payment of ZL in the low state. It would then be the case that
1 ¡ e¡¸r
1 ¡ e¡¸ r
¡° > 1:
Taking logarithms on both sides, and noticing that r < 1, so that the logarithm of r is
negative, establishes that ° is then strictly larger than log((1¡e¡¸r)=(1¡e¡¸))=log(r). The
left hand side of (18) is thus strictly smaller than the right hand side, so that values of ° that
satisfy (18) can always be found. As we saw in Proposition (1), the ¯rst inequality in (18)
implies that creditors prefer the contract that pays ZH to autarky. When this inequality is
violated, a contract with ZH is less desirable than autarky because it gives lower utility in
the low state and the same utility in the high state.
The second inequality in (18) implies that the numerator of Ã is positive so that the left
hand side of (19) is between zero and one. In addition, (7) implies that ° ¡ n(¸) is positive
so that the right hand side is both larger than the left hand side and between zero and 1.
As a result, there exists a nonempty set of values of ¼ satisfying both inequalities in (19).










































19For creditors not to wish to be paid more than ZH, this has to be smaller than or equal to
zero. Given the ¯rst inequality in (18), it is both necessary and su±cient for this to be true
that both the second inequality in (18) and the second inequality in (19) hold.
Now turn to the desirability of setting Y above ZL but below ZH. The derivative of (17)



































For creditors not to wish to be paid less than ZH, this has to be nonnegative. The ¯rst
inequality in (19) is necessary and su±cient for this.
The second inequality in (18) requires that r be smaller than n¡1(°)=¸ so that ZH has to
be greater than ZL=ro. The reason this is needed is that (7) implies that creditors prefer a
payment larger than ZH in the high state. If ZH were lower than ZL=ro, they would prefer it
in the low state as well, and the result would be that ZH would not be the optimal payment
level. The fact that, at the equilibrium contract, ZH can be \too large" in the low state
plays a key role in some of the results below.
When ° is close to the upper limit de¯ned by (18), Ã is close to zero so that ¼ has to be
close to zero as well. The reason is that ZH is nearly ideal for ZL so that, if the probability
of ZH were substantial, creditors would prefer a higher payment. As ° is reduced below its
upper limit, Ã rises and the acceptable values of ¼ rise. There is a limit, however, to the
size of ¼, Since creditors would like the payment to exceed ZH when the state is high, the
probability of the high state cannot be large. This is illustrated in Figure 3, which depicts
the ranges of ° and ¼ that satisfy (18) and (19) when ¸ = 1 and r = :8. In this case, the
maximum value of ¼ is about .45.
20Figure 3:














Values of π and γ that make Z





3 Bank capital in the two period model
Before committing to deposit their funds at a bank, potential creditors are assumed to
observe the bank's equity.14 This equity consists of k ¸ 0 units of K per depositor that
the bank owners have \invested" in their bank. The proceeds from these investments are
available to pay depositors in period 2. A bank with equity k whose contract o®ers Y is
promising total payouts to creditors in state i that equal the minimum of Y and Zi(1 + k).
If anything is left over, the di®erence between Zi(1 + k) and Y is distributed to the bank
owners in proportion to their initial contributions. If (1 + k)ZL = Y , depositors are fully
insured against the state. I restrict attention to contracts with (1 + k)ZL · Y . This is
without loss of generality because increasing k beyond this point does not have any e®ect
on the consumption of depositors (who receive Y ) or bank owners (who receive the returns
from the additional units of K).
14Because each bank ends up with a volume of creditors equal to one, creditors can determine the amount of
capital that each bank has per creditor (or deposit). An alternative formulation would have banks announce
their capital per unit of deposits and impose a mechanism that ensures compliance with this announcement.
21The equilibrium contract is the pair fY;kg that maximizes the utility of creditors Uc
subject to the constraint that banker utility be the no lower than under autarky. Under




H + (1 ¡ ¼)Z
»
L:
Bank owners have a concave utility function so they bene¯t from sharing the investment
of k equally among themselves. This means that the owners of a bank with equity k have to
give up !k units of their own endowment. In exchange, they receive ! times the di®erence
between the bank's revenue of (1 + k)Zi and its obligation Y . With (1 + k)ZL · Y , owners
receive a distribution from their bank only in the high state. Denoting the consumption of
bank owners in state i by Cbi, we have
CbL = ZL(1 ¡ !k) and CbH = ZH(1 ¡ !k) + !(ZH(1 + k) ¡ Y ): (20)
The capital infusion k thus lowers consumption in the low state while having no e®ect on
the high state for given Y . By the same token, creditors bene¯t from a higher k in the low
state whenever there is less than full insurance so Y > ZL(1 + k). This implies that, when
capital infusions are possible, the equilibrium utility of bank owners cannot exceed their
utility under autarky. The reason is that it would then be possible to increase the utility of
depositors by raising k while still giving bank owners Uba. As a result, the equilibrium must
satisfy
¼(ZH(1 + !) ¡ !Y )
» + (1 ¡ ¼)(ZL(1 ¡ !k))
» = Uba: (21)
This equation gives the amount by which owners who put up equity k need to be compensated
by being allowed to pay out a Y lower than ZH.15 It is convenient to recast (21) as an equation
giving k as a function of Y






ZH(1 + !) ¡ !Y
¶1¡°
< 0: (22)
15Notice that, since the bank must have funds left over in the high state to make payments to its owners
when k > 0, equilibrium deposit contracts cannot involve bank runs in this state.
22While depositors are assured of receiving Y in the high state, they receive it in the low










Taking into account the need to vary k as Y varies in accordance with (22), the change in
Uc as Y varies is given by












(1 ¡ ¼)¸(1 + k)ZLe¡¸(1+k)ZL=Y











At an interior equilibrium, dUc=dY in (23) must be zero.
I now show that, even when » = °, bank owners may choose to capitalize their banks.
Proposition 3. Suppose that » = °, and ¸, °, and r satisfy (18). If either ¼ satis¯es (19)
or Y is required to be smaller than or equal to ZH, the equilibrium contract features k > 0
and Y < ZH.
Proof. The conditions of the proposition imply that, with k set equal to zero, Y · ZH and
creditors prefer this contract to autarky. If the equilibrium contract with k = 0 has Y < ZH,
bank owners obtain more utility than at autarky when k = 0 so they compete by setting
k > 0. To demonstrate that k > 0 when the equilibrium contract with k = 0 has Y = ZH,
it is su±cient to show that dUc=dY < 0 in (23) when Y = ZH and k = 0. Letting r denote























































23where the ¯rst inequality follows from the fact that (18) implies that (1¡e¡¸r)r¡°=(1¡e¡¸)
is less than one while the second inequality follows from the fact that (18) requires that
° < n(¸r):
This proposition may be surprising because it gives fairly general conditions under which
bank owners o®er insurance to depositors in spite of the fact that they both have the same
risk tolerance. When ZH is the depositor's favorite value of Y , as implied by the combination
of (18) and (19), the insurance is o®ered because creditors in the low state would prefer a
lower value of Y . This motivation for insurance remains valid when banks are not allowed to
make a payment of more than ZH, as long as the second inequality in (18) holds. Creditors
are then willing to give up Y in exchange for a higher value of k.
As might be expected, this willingness of bankers to insure depositors by infusing equity
into their banks carries over to the case where » = 1 and ° < 1. One question that arises in
this case is whether bank owners would then fully insure their depositors by placing su±cient
equity in their bank to pay Y to all depositors in the low state. Full insurance requires that
Y be set equal to the expected value of Zi, ¼ZH +(1¡¼)ZL, and that depositors receive in
this in both states of nature. Since banks only have (1 + k)ZL in the low state, (1 + k)ZL
must equal the expected value of Zi as well. This is possible only if bank owners have
su±cient resources. When bank owners stake their entire endowment as equity, k equals





It turns out, however, that this condition is insu±cient for full insurance to be observed in
equilibrium.
Proposition 4. Suppose that » = 1 and ° < 1 and (24) holds. If (7) is violated, the
equilibrium contract features (1 + k)ZL < Y whereas (1 + k)ZL = Y if (7) is satis¯ed.
Proof. Since » = 1 and (24) holds, bank owners are willing to o®er the full insurance contract
with Y = ¼ZH +(1¡¼)ZL = (1+k)ZL. Moreover, since ° < 1, potential depositors strictly
24prefer to deposit their endowment and receive this full insurance payment to remaining in
autarky. Lowering Y below ¼ZH + (1 ¡ ¼)ZL = (1 + k)ZL implies that depositors receive
less in both states regardless of k, which is bad for them.





















where the second equality follows from the fact that, with » = 1, (22) implies that Á0 =
¡¼=[(1 ¡ ¼)ZL]. It follows that dUc=dY is positive if and only if (7) is satis¯ed.
Condition (7) leads depositors to wish to \gamble" with bank runs, and thus prevents
full insurance from being o®ered in equilibrium even though bankers are risk neutral and
depositors are risk averse. The ensuing outcome does not maximize true average depositor
welfare ex post, since this would be accomplished by letting bankers fully insure depositors.
In the next section, I consider how policy can a®ect these ex post outcomes more generally.
4 Regulatory Policy in the Two Period Model
Even in democracies, political discourse often involves elements of paternalism. Such pater-
nalism is easier to understand if people are biased in the pursuit of their own objectives,
as I have assumed here. In this case, outside observers who care for depositors but do not
agree with the depositors' self-assessment of their competence would be inclined to institute
policies that raise the average ex post utility of depositors. This true average ex post creditor
utility, which I denote by ~ Uc, would equal their expected ex ante utility in the absence of
bias. This section is devoted to studying the e®ect of various ¯nancial regulations on ~ Uc,
which is given by
~ Uc =
µ






Since actual policy is probably also guided by other considerations, including creditor's own
perceived utility as well as the repercussions of regulation on other variables, this paper's
analysis of policy is necessarily partial.
254.1 Capital Requirements
I continue to suppose that owners are compensated for increases k by reductions in Y that
keep them indi®erent, as in (21) and (22). The change in ~ Uc when one changes Y while
varying k in this manner is

















~ Uck = (1 ¡ ¼)ZLY
°¡1:
It follows that:
Proposition 5. Suppose that (18) holds and that either banks are prevented from paying
more than ZH or that (19) holds. Further, suppose that (24) holds. Then, a su±cient
condition for ex post average utility to rise from its equilibrium level when k is increased




log(¸) ¡ log(1 ¡ e¡¸)
¸
: (26)
Proof. The conditions of this proposition imply that potential creditors deposit their endow-
ment and that k > 0 in equilibrium. Since (24) holds, the equilibrium is interior and dUc=dY
in (23) equals zero. Therefore UcY + UckÁ0 = 0, where UcY and Uck are both positive. Ex
post average utility would increase by raising k if ^ UcY + ~ UckÁ0 were negative. The ¯rst term
of ~ UcY is smaller than the ¯rst term of Ucy because (1 ¡ e¡¸(1+k)ZL=Y)=(1 ¡ e¡¸) is larger
than (1 + k)ZL=Y . Thus, a su±cient condition for ~ UcY + ~ UckÁ0 to be negative is that
¸e¡¸(1+k)ZL=Y
1 ¡ e¡¸ < 1:
The ratio (1 + k)Zl=Y gives the actual probability that depositors receive Y in the low
state. This proposition thus says that, if this probability is above the value given by the
26right hand side of (26), ex post utility is increased by raising the capital of banks above its
equilibrium value. The value of (1+ k)ZL=Y that satis¯es (26) with equality is the value of
x that leads G0(x) in (2) to equal one. In other words, it is the value of x such the subjective
probability of being among the ¯rst x has a slope of one with respect to x, just as does
the true probability. The second equation in (2) implies that the slope of the subjective
probability is larger for smaller values of x and smaller for larger ones.
This result has the following interpretation: One important bene¯t of raising k while re-
ducing Y is that depositors have an increased probability of receiving Y rather than nothing.
For (1 + k)Zl=Y above the value on the RHS of (26), however, the subjective probability of
receiving Y rises less than the objective probability so that depositors perceive this bene¯t
as being smaller than it is. As a result, they end up better o® on average if k is increased
(and Y reduced) relative to the contract that they ¯nd most attractive.
Since k and Y are determined in equilibrium, condition (26) does not apply directly to
the exogenous parameters. However, because k > 0 and Y < ZH, (1+k)ZL=Y is necessarily
larger than the exogenous ratio ZL=ZH so a stronger su±cient condition than (26) involves
putting ZL=ZH on the left hand side. Even in this stronger form, condition (26) is not very
demanding. Figure 4 demonstrates this by depicting the value on the RHS of (26) for various
values of ¸. Its limit is .5 for ¸ arbitrarily low and then falls steadily as ¸ rises. This is
consistent with the fact that, for high values of ¸ the probability of being among the ¯rst
x is close to one even if x is small, so that G0(x) becomes smaller than one for quite small
values of x.
Even when (26) is satis¯ed, depositors oppose capital requirements that raise k, since they
obtain the contract they most like under laissez faire.
4.2 Clawbacks and deposit insurance
A second policy choice is to treat ¯nancial contracts like non-¯nancial ones and subject them
to clawback in bankruptcy. This would mean that depositors who arrive after all the funds
at their bank are exhausted could sue and end up receiving the same resources as those who
27Figure 4:







Value of x such that dG(x)/dx is equal to one
λ
arrived while the bank still had funds. The utility of depositors from a contract with fk;Y g
would then be
Ud = ¼Y
° + (1 ¡ ¼)((1 + k)ZL)
°; (27)










When » = °, the ratio of dk=dY that keeps depositors indi®erent at k = 0 and Y = ZH
is equal to Á0 in (22). This implies that bank owners set k = 0 and Y = ZH. The outcome
is thus the same as under autarky even if bank owners are allowed to add capital to their
banks. The end result of this is that a policy of clawbacks essentially eliminates the incentive
to deposit in a bank, though this result obviously depends crucially on my assumption that
everyone is endowed with the same asset to begin with.
Now consider a policy of o®ering deposit insurance, which is ¯nanced by lump sum taxes
on those individuals who are potential depositors. Since creditors take taxes as given, outlays
from the deposit insurance scheme raise the attractiveness of deposits. Indeed, deposits with
28insurance are more attractive than either autarky or the outcome with clawbacks as long as
their o±cial payout exceeds the certainty equivalent amount (¼Z
°
H + (1 ¡ ¼)Z
°
L)1=°.
All the taxes that pay for the insurance are assumed to come from the depositors them-
selves, however. Depositor consumption in the high state is thus equal to Y , where Y is the
amount bank owners pay out in this state. Similarly, depositor consumption in the low state
remains (1 + k)ZL where k is the amount of K that owners pledge in period 0. Thus, the
expected utility of depositors is once again given by (27) as long as Y is interpreted as the
amount the government takes from the bank in the high state.
If the government wants to keep owners willing to operate their banks, which is consistent
with my assumption that only potential depositors are taxed, (21) must still hold. When
» = °, this implies that the changes in k and Y that leave bank owners indi®erent leave
depositors indi®erent as well. In other words, adding capital to banks does not improve
welfare. When ¯nanced in this way, the best deposit insurance outcome is the autarkic
Pareto Optimum.
4.3 Regulations on the asset-side of banks' balance sheets
Since the economy considered so far has a single productive asset, it has to be modi¯ed to
discuss the possibility that regulators would force banks to change the composition of their
assets. In this subsection, I examine a particularly simple modi¯cation for this purpose. I
introduce an alternate asset that is similar to K in the sense that it has a payo® of ZH +dZU
with probability ¼ +d¼ and a payo® ZL +dZL with probability 1 ¡¼ ¡d¼ where dZH, dZL
and d¼ are all small. Asset K can be converted into this alternative asset, but there are
some restrictions. First, individuals who manage their own asset can only convert either
their entire endowment or none of it. Second, banks can convert their K into the alternative
asset but can only do it if they convert all the assets in their possession. Moreover, I require
depositors to either hand over their entire endowment to a bank or to keep it all themselves.
These rather strong assumptions ensure that no one can hold a diversi¯ed portfolio,
and thereby simplify the analysis considerably. In particular, they make it easy to state a
29condition under which the alternative asset would be undesirable to depositors if they were
to hold it directly. Using the autarkic utility (12), and supposing that dZH, dZL and d¼ are




















H < 0: (28)
The objective of this subsection is to prove that combinations of dZH, dZL and d¼ can be
found such that (28) holds and depositors are nonetheless better o® on average if banks are
forced to hold the alternate asset. I further show that some of these combinations reduce
the perceived expected utility of depositors from depositing their endowment at banks that
hold this alternate asset, so that the alternate asset would only be held if the government
mandated it.
These results are demonstrated in a setting that is purposefully kept simple, and I abstract
from bank capital in this subsection. As already discussed, this ¯ts with Money Market
Funds, which are indeed heavily regulated in terms of the assets that they may hold. Without
bank equity and with Y = ZH, the average ex post utility of depositors whose bank holds
their original asset K is given by (25) with Y = ZH and k = 0. Di®erentiating this, one
























Without bank equity and with Y = ZH, the expected utility of creditors is given by (16) with
Y given by ZH. Di®erentiating this equation, one obtains the change in perceived utility if























1 ¡ e¡¸: (30)
It follows that:
Proposition 6. Suppose that k = 0 and that either (18) and (19) hold or that Y must be
no larger than ZH, (15) holds and the ¯rst inequality in (19) holds. There exist alternate
































where r = ZL=ZH. These satisfy (28) and lead dUc in (30) to be negative while making (29)
positive so that ~ U rises relative to K when banks hold these alternate assets.
There also exist alternate assets with dZL = 0, dZH < 0, d¼ > 0 and
























These too satisfy (28) while making (29) positive so that ex post average utility ~ U rises when
these assets are held at depositors' banks. There are parameter ranges consistent with (32)
such that banks holding these alternate assets give less perceived utility Uc to their depositors
than banks holding the original asset K.
Proof. According to Proposition 2, Y = ZH when (18) and (19) hold. The reasoning in the
Proposition's proof also establishes that, assuming (15) holds, the ¯rst inequality in (19)
implies that Y is no lower than ZH. Thus, the conditions of the proposition imply that (29)
and (30) give the change in average ex post utility and expected utility respectively.
The ¯rst inequality in (31) implies that d~ Uc > 0. The inequality with the ¯rst term of
the min operator ensures that (28) holds while the one with the second term leads dUc to be
negative. I ¯rst demonstrate that the left hand side of (31) is always smaller than the ¯rst
term of the min operator. The former is actually the same as the latter with ° set to equal
one. For the left hand side of (31) to be smaller, the derivative of °=(r¡° ¡ 1) with respect
to ° be negative. The expression tends to 1=log(1=r) when ° tends to zero while it equals
1=(1=r ¡ 1) when ° = 1 with the latter being smaller than the former. The derivative itself
is
r¡° ¡ 1 ¡ ° log(r)r¡°
(r¡° ¡ 1)2 :
The numerator of this expression is zero at ° = 0. For the derivative to change sign between
° = 0 and ° = 1, this numerator would have to have another zero in this range. But, this is
31impossible because the derivative of the numerator with respect to ° equals ¡°2(log(r))2r¡°,
which is negative for r > 0.
I now prove that the left hand side of (31) is smaller than the second term of the min
operator. Since the denominators of both expressions are positive, this inequality is true if
e
¡¸r ¡ e
¡¸ < ¸(1 ¡ r)e
¡¸r or 1 ¡ e
¸(r¡1) < ¸(1 ¡ r):
Since ¸(1 ¡ r) is an arbitrary positive number, this inequality requires that x=(1 ¡ e¡x)
be greater than one for all positive x. Its limit when x = 0 is 1 while it equals in¯nity for x
in¯nite. The derivative of this expression with respect to x is
1 ¡ e¡x ¡ xe¡x
(1 ¡ e¡x)2 :
The numerator of this is zero at x = 0 and the derivative of this numerator with respect to x
is x2e¡x which is always positive. Thus, there is no other value of x for which the numerator
equals zero. As a result, x=(1 ¡ e¡x) is monotone increasing from x = 0 onwards.
The ¯rst inequality of (32) implies that alternate assets with this property lead to d~ Uc > 0
while the second inequality ensures that they satisfy (28). The numerator of the left hand
side is smaller than the numerator of the right hand side while the denominator of the right
hand side is smaller. Thus, the left hand side is indeed smaller than the right hand side.
Using (29), an increase in ¼ accompanied by a reduction in ZH lowers Uc if
d¼ < °¼ +
° ¡ (1 ¡ ¼)(¸r)e¡¸r
e¡¸r ¡ e¡¸ :
For this change to increase ~ Uc, it must satisfy the ¯rst inequality in (32). Values of d¼
that satisfy both simultaneously can be found if and only if the left hand side of (32) is
smaller than the right hand side of the above inequality. In the numerical experiments I
carried out, this turned out to be true whenever (1 ¡ e¡¸r)r¡° > (1 ¡ e¡¸) as required by
(15). This condition is readily veri¯ed when ¸ = 1 and r = :8 while ¼ and ° belong to the
set depicted in Figure 3 that satis¯es (18) and (19).
Proposition 6 shows that there are two broad ways of raising ex post welfare by changing
the characteristics of bank assets. They both involve increasing the probability ¼ of realizing
32a favorable outcome. In the ¯rst, depositors give up some payo® in the low state by lowering
ZL, while in the latter they give up ZH. If the rise in ¼ is su±ciently modest, utility would fall
if the assets were held directly by depositors and perceived utility from having the alternate
assets at the bank would fall as well. It is nonetheless possible to raise ex post average welfare
because lowering the probability of the low state reduces an ine±ciency. This ine±ciency is
the result of the fact that depositors are not all treated the same in a bank run. Depositors,
of course, are attracted to this di®erence in treatment even though it is bad for them ex
post.
5 A three period model with the potential for costly
asset transfers
I maintain the assumption that creditors can deposit their endowment at a bank in period
0 and that they care only about consumption in period 2. The key issue I take up in this
section is the e®ect of permitting the asset K to be reassigned, at a cost, before it yields Zi.
This transfer (or liquidation) is allowed to occur in period 1. As in Allen and Gale (1998),
this is the period where uncertainty about the realization of Zi in period 2 is resolved. Even
though I suppose that no depositor wishes to consume in this period, I show that depositors
may choose bank contracts that allow them to withdraw from their bank account in period
1.
To make the cost of these withdrawals transparent, I introduce a new class of agents
which I call arbitrageurs. For simplicity, arbitrageurs live only in period 1 and 2. They are
born with a substantial endowment M of a good that they can consume in period 1. This
good is called good 1, with good 2 representing the good that is produced by K. The utility
function of arbitrageurs is assumed to be
Ua = C1a + C2a; (33)
where Cia represents their consumption of good i in period i. Arbitrageurs are thus willing
to buy asset K in period 1 for a price that equals the yield they expect to receive from this
33asset in period 2. When controlled by arbitrageurs, this yield is ½Zi in state i. The constant
½ · 1 captures the idea that the transfer of control between a bank and an arbitrageur is
costly, perhaps because some knowledge about how to manage the asset is lost in the process.
Arbitrageurs are also assumed to be able to credibly pledge asset K to agents that give
them units of good 1. The existence of arbitrageurs makes it possible for banks to give
depositors units of good 1 that banks obtain by selling units of asset K. These depositors
can then turn to arbitrageurs, and o®er them the units of good 1 they obtained from their
bank in exchange for promises to receive good 2. Competition among arbitrageurs ensures
that the price in terms of good 1 for a unit of good 2 is one. The result is that, if banks
o®er deposit contracts with a promised payment of Y1 in period 1, those depositors who
successfully withdraw their funds in period 1 obtain Y1 units of consumption in period 2.
The critical question is whether equilibrium contracts o®ered by banks allow depositors
to withdraw funds in period 1. It is a nontrivial question because, when ½ < 1, period 1
withdrawals costs resources. It turns out that there are two di®erent reasons for equilibrium
deposit contracts to be demandable in period 1.
First, depositors may have more queue optimism in period 1, right after information
about the state becomes available, than in period 2. The idea here is not that depositors are
particularly well informed, only that they might see themselves as reacting more promptly
than others to public information. The example of the 2007 run on Northern Rock, a UK
bank dedicated to mortgages, may be useful for illustration. Northern Rock ¯nanced many
of its mortgages in public securities markets, and the cost of this funding rose through
2007 with the result that its stock price halved between January and September 1, 2007.
Lines of depositors wishing to withdraw funds did not form until September 15, the day
after the Bank of England ¯rst pledged that it would support Northern Rock with its own
funds. This does not demonstrate that depositors would not continue to be optimistic about
withdrawals if their deposits did not allow them to obtain their funds on demand at all times.
It is, however, consistent with the possibility that depositors may be particularly optimistic
regarding their capacity to react quickly to public events.
34Imagine, then, that depositors have a subjective probability that they will be among the
¯rst x to withdraw in the low state equal to G(x) in period 1 and equal to x in period 2.
Suppose, further, that we restrict attention to banks that put up no capital and to contracts
that promise a payment of ZH in period 2. If the contracts does not give a depositor access
to funds in period 1, the depositors expected utility from the contracts is
µ







Consider now the alternative of o®ering the depositor a contract with one added feature,
namely the right to withdraw ½ZH in period 1 in exchange for extinguishing the bank's
obligation. It follows that
Proposition 7. Suppose that either (18) and (19) hold or that Y cannot exceed ZH and that







1 ¡ e¡¸ : (35)
Suppose (for this proposition only) that depositors believe that their probability of being among
the ¯rst x to withdraw is x in period 2 but G(x;¸) in period 1. Then, if ½ satis¯es (35), the
contract that allows withdrawals of ½ZH in period 1 in lieu of the right of ZH in period 2 is
preferred by depositors to the contract that gives only the latter right.
Proof. The Appendix proves that G(x) is strictly increasing in ¸, which implies that the
right hand side of (35) is smaller than one. As a result, there exist values of ½ < 1 satisfying
this inequality.
The conditions of the proposition imply that, if banks were unable to o®er payments in
period 1, the equilibrium contract would have a payment of ZH. The modi¯ed contract that
allows withdrawals of ½ZH in period 1 does not create runs in period 1 if the state is high
because depositors have nothing to lose by waiting until period 2. The only equilibrium in
the low state with the modi¯ed contract involves a run. If a depositor expects all others
to withdraw, he should run too because otherwise he gets nothing. Even if no one else
35withdraws, an individual withdrawing in the low state gets ½ZH while he would only expect
to get ZH with probability ZL=ZH by waiting until period 2. The utility of the former is
(½ZH)° while that of the latter is (ZL=ZH)Z
°
H so the former is larger than the latter if (35)
holds.
Since the modi¯ed contract gives the same utility as the original one in the high state, it
is preferable if it gives more utility in the low state. This occurs if
1 ¡ e¸ZL=ZH







which is implied by (35).
This proposition thus shows that, if optimism exists only about withdrawals in period
1, certain contracts that allow withdrawals at time 1 will be preferred to contracts that are
otherwise identical but allow withdrawals only in period 2. This idea should also extend
to more elaborate contracts than those considered in the proposition. I do not consider
the issue further because it turns out that there is also a subtler reason for contracts that
allow withdrawals in period 1 to dominate those that do not. Allowing for these withdrawals
has the advantage of allowing contractual terms to be modi¯ed to suit the queuing bias of
depositors. Instead of being forced to make a single contractual payment in both states of
nature, banks can o®er a payment in period 1 that is tailored to the low state.
To show that this is valuable on its own, I now let depositors be equally optimistic about
being among the ¯rst x to withdraw in period and in period 2.






(1 ¡ e¡n¡1(°))(¸ZL=n¡1(°))°: (36)
Suppose that (18) and the ¯rst inequality of (19) hold, that k is zero and that banks are
prevented from o®ering a payment of more than ZH in period 2. Then, for values of ½ < 1
that satisfy (36), the equilibrium contract o®ers depositors a choice between withdrawing ZH
in period 2 or ½ZL=ro in period 1, where ro is de¯ned in (8). This equilibrium contract leads
to a run if and only if the state is low.
36Proof. The right hand side of (36) gives the ratio of Uc in the low state when resources equal
ZL and the payments equals ZH to the level of Uc when resources equal ZL and payments
equal ZL=ro. This ratio is therefore smaller than one unless ZL=ro = ZH. Condition (18),
however, implies that ° < n(¸ZL=ZH) so that ZL=ro < ZH. Therefore, values of ½ < 1 that
satisfy (36) can be found.
The conditions of the proposition imply that banks o®er a payment of ZH in period 2
if they do not o®er to make payments in period 1. For any value of ½ satisfying (36), the


















and (36) implies that this exceeds the utility of being paid ZH when resources equal ZL.
The contract that pays ½ZL=ro in period 1 does in fact yield this level of utility in the low
state because depositors run to the bank in period 1. The reason they withdraw their funds
in this state is that, whether others withdraw their funds or not, they thereby guarantee
themselves a higher level of utility than they obtain by waiting.
They do not run in the high state because the required payment, ½ZL=ro is less than ½ZH
which is less than the amount that depositors obtain by waiting. Waiting nets depositors
ZH whether others withdraw in period 1 or not because depositors who withdraw in period
1 get less than ½ZH. Relative to a contract that only allows ZH to be withdrawn in period
2, the proposed contract therefore gives the same utility in the high state and higher utility
in the low state.
Lastly, the derivation of (8) implies that ½ZL=ro is indeed the depositor's favorite payment
when the bank's resources equal ½ZL.
The advantage of the contract that gives depositors the right to withdraw ½ZL=ro in
period 1 is that it lets banks make a payment that depositors prefer to ZH when the state is
low. Note that, if banks were free to adjust their second period payment to raise the utility
of their depositors, condition (7) would lead them to set it equal to ZH=ro, which exceeds
ZH. This would raise utility in the high state as well and would make contracts that allow
37deposits to withdraw funds in period 1 even more desirable. Moreover, since the payment
and the utility obtained in the high state would be even larger, the arguments in Proposition
8 would still establish that the optimal payment in period 1 is ½ZL=ro. As a consequence,
there would still be a run in the low state.
I now turn to the analysis of bank capital in the three period model. As far as bank
owners are concerned, the addition of period 1 does not matter. For the bank to be able
to make payments based on (1 + k) units of K per depositor, each bank owner must give
up !k units. Since the proceeds from this equity injection are paid out to depositors in the
low state, owners' consumption in the low state remains ZH(1 ¡ !k). Owner utility thus
remains equal to the left hand side of (21), where Y equals the payments made to depositors
in the high state. Since bank owners are only allowed to keep the bank resources that remain
after all depositors have been paid their contractual obligations, Y must equal the amount
that depositors are entitled to collect in period 2 (if they do not withdraw in period 1). For
bankers to be willing to provide positive quantities of capital, (21) and (22) must hold with
this interpretation of Y .
As long as (1 + k)ZL=ro is smaller than Y , the argument made in Proposition 8 implies
that depositors prefer to have the choice of ½(1+k)ZL=ro in period 1 or Y in period 2 rather
than having only the right of demanding Y in period 2. Indeed, the contract that allows
depositors to withdraw ½(1 + k)ZL=ro in period 1 is the one that depositors prefer among
all those in which the ¯rm pays out Y in period 2 and has (1 + k) units of K with which to
pay o® depositors in the low state. For low levels of capital, conditions (18) and (19) thus
ensure that this is the equilibrium contract.
Because the equilibrium contract sets the payment in period 1 to ¸½(1 + k)ZL=n¡1(°)
and the ¯rm has ½(1 + k)ZL units of good 1 available in the low state of period 1, the
actual probability that depositors are paid in this state equals ¸=n¡1(°). This probability
is independent of k because the period 1 payment is adjusted upwards when owners inject
more capital into their bank.
38The perceived utility of depositors under this contract is
Uc = ¼Y








This equation shows that a reduction in ½ makes k less attractive relative to Y . As the next
Proposition shows, this implies that bank owners will capitalize their banks in equilibrium
for some values of ½ < 1 but not for others.
Proposition 9. Suppose that (18) and the ¯rst inequality of (19) hold, and that banks are











For certain values of ½ that satisfy (38), the equilibrium value of k is positive and banks
o®ers to let depositors withdraw ½(1 + k)ZL=ro in the ¯rst period. At interior equilibria of
this kind, k falls with ½.
Condition (38) implies that (36) holds but the opposite is not true. There thus exist
values of ½ that satisfy the latter but not the former. In this case, the equilibrium has k = 0.
Proof. The expression on the right hand side of (38) is equal to one when ¸ = n¡1(°).












Condition (18) requires that ° > n(¸). Since ª > 0, dª=d¸ > 0. As a result, the right
hand side of (38) is smaller than one. Values of ½ smaller than one that obey (38) can thus
be found.
By setting ZL = rZH, the right hand side of (36) can be rewritten as
ª
1 ¡ e¡¸(1 ¡ e
¡¸r)r
¡°:
This would equal ª if r were equal to one. Denoting the expression on the right hand side









39Condition (18) implies that this is positive. Since ZL < ZH, the expression on the right hand
side of (36) is smaller than the expression on the right hand side of (38).
Di®erentiating (37), while using (22), the gain in utility from raising Y while keeping




























It follows that the derivative of Uc with respect to Y is positive when k = 0, Y = ZH,
and ½ satis¯es (36) but not (38). Since k cannot be negative, the equilibrium for these values
of ½ involves setting k = 0. For values of ½ slightly above the level that is needed for (38)
to be satis¯ed, Y must be slightly smaller than ZH, so that k must be slightly positive. The
second order conditions then require that the equilibrium value of Y fall when ½ rises so that
k must be rising in ½. Lastly, the fact that Y is near YH and k is near zero implies that
(1 + k)ZL=ro is smaller than Y . Given that (36) holds, the equilibrium gives depositors a
choice between withdrawing (1 + k)ZL=ro in period 1 or withdrawing Y in period 2.
This proposition implies that, as long as the cost of liquidation is modest, the result that
bank owners provide some insurance to depositors extends to the case where depositors can
also withdraw funds in the ¯rst period. Here, bank owners who add capital also increase the
maximum amount that depositors are contractually allowed to withdraw in period 1. This is
so attractive to depositors that they are willing to give up more resources in the high state
than the owners need as compensation.
Interestingly, the following proposition shows that bank capital is not attractive from
the point of view of average ex post welfare. When ¯rms let depositors choose between a
withdrawal of Yo(½(1 + k)ZL in period 1 and a withdrawal of Y , this welfare equals
~ Uc = ¼Y









40Proposition 10. When ex post consumer welfare is given by (40), and the combinations of
k and Y must satisfy (22), this welfare is maximized by setting k = 0.



























d~ Uc=dY thus rises with ½ and, because n¡1(°) < ¸, is positive even when ½ = 1. Since k
cannot be negative, the optimum is to set k = 0.
This result of proposition 10 is quite di®erent from the one in Proposition 5, which
stated that increasing capital above its equilibrium level raised ex post depositor welfare
under fairly weak conditions. In both cases, raising capital requirements has the e®ect of
increasing the total amount that banks pay out in the low state while compensating bank
owners by reducing their obligations in the high state. The di®erence is that, in the two
period model considered above, the amount obtained by successful withdrawers in the low
state also fell alongside the high state payment when capital was increased. This resulted
in a bene¯t that depositors often did not value su±ciently, namely that it increased their
probability of succeeding in obtaining a payment.
In the three period model studied here, by contrast, the amount obtained by successful
withdrawers in the low state payment rises when capital is increased, while their probability of
being successful stays constant. As a result, there is no social gain that is being insu±ciently
valued by depositors. In fact, the opposite is true. Depositors with queuing bias ¯nd it
attractive to be given a larger payment in the low state when they are successful. However,
from the point of view of average ex post welfare, this introduces undesirable consumption
volatility.
41Before closing this section it is worth showing that clawbacks and deposit insurance can
also reinstate the autarkic Pareto Optimum in the three period model. Consider clawbacks
¯rst. If depositors were to accept a contract that o®ered a payment of more than ZL in
period 1, there would still be a period 1 bank run in the low state, and they would all end up
with ½ZL. Such a contract would not attract depositors because they would do better under
autarky. Banks could, instead, o®er a contract with a lower period 1 payment. However,
this would again yield the autarkic allocation.
Now consider deposit insurance. As we saw earlier, deposit insurance eliminates any
incentive for banks owners to contribute capital to their banks, so I set k = 0. In their
competition for depositors, banks would set a second period payment no lower than ZH,
since lower payments would reduce expected depositor utility. Because of my assumption of
lump sum taxes, setting a higher payment does not change the equilibrium. For concreteness,
suppose this equals ZH. If the promised period 1 payment is even slightly smaller, there are
no runs in period 1. While banks do not have any preference regarding this payment, the
government would gain by making sure it is below ZH. As in Diamond and Dybvig (1983),
one important bene¯t of deposit insurance is that it eliminates ine±cient liquidations by
giving depositors con¯dence in their deposits. One importance di®erence, however, is that
here the government has to collect taxes in the low state to make good on this insurance.
6 Conclusion
This paper has provided a justi¯cation for various policies that governments use to regulate
¯nancial institutions, including a deposit insurance policy where the government makes
actual losses in bad states of nature as well as regulations that control the assets of uninsured
institutions. The bene¯t of these policies is their ability to help depositors who are too
optimistic about how they will fare in a run.
Both to simplify the analysis and to preserve its comparability with important earlier
studies like Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Allen and Gale (1998), the structure of the
model I have presented is extremely sparse. Unfortunately, this raises the question of how
42the policy implications of the model would carry over to a richer environment. The model
implies, for example, that clawbacks in bankruptcy and deposit insurance both eliminate
ine±cient runs and achieve the same ¯nal allocation.
In practice, these two forms of regulation di®er in other ways. Clawbacks, for example,
lead to more uncertainty for individuals who withdraw funds since the withdrawal can be
reversed. Such uncertainty may be more costly when withdrawals are more frequent, and this
could be a reason why non-¯nancial bankruptcies are subject to clawbacks in the U.S. while
¯nancial institutions are not. It does remain uncertain, however, whether there should also
exist ¯nancial institutions such as money market funds that are subject to neither clawbacks
nor government insurance.
The model suggests that the advisability of requiring ¯nancial institutions to hold more
capital than they would on their own depends crucially on the contracts that they write. If
increased capital leads them to reduce their contractual obligations in panics so that more
depositors are able to withdraw, the model provides a rationale for increasing this capital.
Capital is advantageous in this case because it reduces the volatility of consumption induced
by depositors' unwarranted optimism. If, however, banks with more capital ¯nd a way to
increase the amount that they pay out to successful withdrawers in a panic, forcing banks to
have more capital may be counterproductive. In the model, banks ability to do this depends
on the timing of withdrawals, consumption and the resolution of uncertainty. It would thus
be valuable to learn how banks react to increases in capital in a richer dynamic model.
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45Appendix
Proof that G(x) is strictly increasing in ¸ for 0 < x < 1 and ¸ > 0




xe¡x¸(1 ¡ e¡¸) ¡ e¡¸(1 ¡ e¡x¸)
(1 ¡ e¡¸)2 :
This is zero at both x = 0 and x = 1. To demonstrate that it is positive for 0 < x < ¸, I ¯rst
prove that, for ¸ > 0, dG=d¸ is increasing in x at x = 0 and decreasing in x at x = 1. I then
prove that the dG=d¸ has no other zeros between 0 and 1 by showing that dG=d¸ is concave
in x at x = 0 and either remains concave or becomes convex in x as x rises. Since it never
turns back from being convex to being concave, dG=d¸ remains above zero for 0 < x < 1.



















At x = 0, d2G=d¸dx has the same sign as 1 ¡ e¡¸ ¡ ¸e¡¸ when ¸ is positive. This is
positive because ¸=(e¸ ¡ 1) is an Einstein function that is smaller than one for ¸ > 0. At
x = 1, d2G=d¸dx has the same sign as e¡¸(1¡¸¡e¡¸). This is negative because the function
e¡¸ is tangent to the function 1 ¡ ¸ at ¸ = 0 and is above 1 ¡ ¸ for higher values of ¸.
The function d3G=d¸dx2 is increasing in x for ¸ > 0. At x = 0, it has the same sign as
(2 + ¸)e¡¸ ¡ 2. This expression equals zero for ¸ = 0 and has a negative derivative with
respect to ¸. It follows that d3G=d¸dx2 < 0 at x = 0 for ¸ > 0 so that the function dG=d¸
is concave in x at x = 0. As x is increased, d3G=d¸dx2 rises. If it becomes positive, dG=d¸
becomes convex in x. It cannot, however, become concave once again for higher values of x.
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